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Ecologists have long been critical with liberal democracy. This critique is not directed at the concept of 
democracy but at a particular type of it: representative liberal democracy. Many ecological thinkers 
consider that liberal democracy and the liberal democratic state are not well-equipped to deal with current 
environmental problems. What is more, they argue, lib ral democracy and the liberal state cannot offer a 
solution because they are part of the problem. The “deliberative turn” in democratic theory could 
represent a way out of the shortcomings of liberal democracy. Several arguments have been put forward 
to claim for an alliance between ecologism and political deliberation; to name but a few, that people’s 
pro-environmental preferences are more likely to emerge in a communicative setting, and that decisions 
reached after collective deliberation will be more democratic, legitimate and ecologically sustainable than 
those resulting from liberal representative processes. Yet there is no guarantee that communicative 
mechanisms will lead to the desired sustainability results, partly because there is no consensus on what 
these results should be in the first place. However, even if deliberative democracy may not necessarily 
improve the sustainability of outcomes, at least some of the limitations of liberal democracy shall be 
addressed.  
This paper focuses on those theories conceiving ecologi al democracy as a solution to some of the 
problems that liberal democracy poses to sustainabil ty. These ecological interpretations and critiques of 
liberal democracy suggest a reform of the liberal democratic state. In this context, the concept of the 
“green state” will be discussed as the institutional form needed to implement an ecological democracy. 
Particular attention will be paid to analyze whether ecological democracy is substantially different from 




1. Democracy and the environment 
 
The relationship between democracy and green values has been a core debate 
within green theorising since the 1990’s (Doherty and de Geus, 1996; Lafferty and 
Meadow, 1996; Mathews, 1996; Minteer and Taylor, 2002). However, such relationship 
still remains at the level of contingency. In Goodin’s words, “to advocate democracy is 
to advocate procedures, to advocate environmentalism is to advocate substantive 
outcomes: what guarantee can we have that the former procedures will yield the latter 
sorts of outcomes?” (1992: 168)1. What is more, it has been suggested that green values 
may conflict with democratic ones, since they represent limits to the wide range of 
possible outcomes (Saward, 1993). Yet despite such tensions and contingencies, most 
                                                
1 Robyn Eckersley formulates this controversy in similar terms when she states that “if democracy is a 
non-negotiable element of green political theory, then how might greens secure their political goals by 
means of a decision-making framework that is supposedly open ended?” (1996: 212). 
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ecologists claim that there is a positive relation between sustainability and democracy 
and that “the more democratic a society is, the more likely it is that sustainability be 
enhanced” (Barry, 1996: 116). 
 Having said that, it should be noted that ecologists have long been critical with 
liberal democracy. This critique is not directed at the concept of democracy itself but at 
a particular type of it: representative liberal democracy. It is often argued that liberal 
democracies are failing to address sustainability issues effectively. Different reasons 
support this claim, namely that liberal democracies hold an instrumental account of the 
non-human world and do not have the tools to effectiv ly organise the political 
participation and representation of all those affected by environmental risks, including 
future generations and non-human nature. As a result, liberal institutions cannot foster 
the democratisation of economic processes, science a d technology that a politics of 
sustainability requires. Moreover, actually existing liberal states do not take seriously 
enough the harmful consequences for nature produced by political centralisation, 
poverty, militarisation and the pursuit of economic growth (Hailwood, 2004: 142). So 
the ability of liberal democratic states to achieve both environmental and democratic 
objectives is compromised. 
But given this critique of liberal democracy, can we claim that there is a 
distinctively environmental conception of democracy? Whatever the green democratic 
model might be, it is generally assumed that it will have to face the “democratic 
paradox” (Eckersley, 1996: 213) of being instantiated within a liberal framework. The 
“deliberative turn” in democratic theory could reprsent a way out of the shortcomings 
of liberal democracy. Representation and voting are central to liberal democracy, based 
on an aggregative conception of democracy. Instead, within a deliberative system, the 
essence of democratic legitimacy is to be found in cit zens’ authentic deliberation about 
collective issues (Dryzek, 2000).  
Over the last decade, environmental political theory has turned its attention to 
deliberation, discussion and reasoning as key components of the green democratic 
model. Deliberative democracy can be described as “the practice of public reasoning”, 
in which “participants make proposals, attempt to persuade others, and determine the 
best outcomes and policies based on the arguments and re sons fleshed out in public 
discourse” (Scholsberg, et. al. 2005: 216). A central aspect of deliberation is the open 
and equal discussion in which participants are given equal treatment, respect and 
opportunities (Saward, 2001: 564)2. Both the discursive and the inclusive components 
of deliberative democracy have led some greens to believe that this is the most adequate 
democratic model for green politics, and e environme tal political theory has explored 
the connection between deliberative democracy and ecologism (Barry, 1996, 1999; 
Dryzek, 1994, 2000; Eckersley, 2000, 2002, 2004; Dobson, 1996a; Smith 2003). 
Although the intrinsic value of deliberation is acknowledged, it is widely agreed that 
deliberative democracy allows greens to embrace democratic process -without having to 
abandon ecological aims and values. More specifically, three main reasons explain this 
deliberative impetus of green political theory.                                                                                                                                  
First, deliberative democracy’s educational potential could promote sustainable 
worldviews and greater environmental awareness through debate in the public arena. 
This is important in view of overcoming liberal democracy’s formal neutrality, which 
                                                
2 This brief description of the distinctive features of deliberative democracy might appear too much a 
generalisation, since there are different, and, often, contradictory, conceptions of deliberative democracy. 
For instance, deliberative democratic theorists disagree over who should participate in the deliberative 
process; the meaning of “rationality”; the collective aim of deliberation; or the adequate terrain for 
debate. For an overview of such questions, see Saward (2001).  
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constitutes an obstacle for greens to advance theirparticular conceptions of the good 
life. Sustainability policies designed by liberal states do not necessarily imply the 
triumph of ecological values within contemporary societies, especially those related to 
the intrinsic value of nature (Levy and Wissenburg, 2004). Achieving sustainability will 
require more than changes at the institutional level. A greening of the political culture 
and of both individual and societal values is needed. A deliberative democracy is 
considered to be the adequate framework for such cultural transformation to take place. 
According to liberal democratic theory, the role of democracy should be the 
aggregation of individual pre-given preferences into a collective choice, therefore 
“contemporary liberal institutions are not designed to encourage engagement and the 
testing of preferences and value orientations” (Smith, 2003: 55). In this respect, 
deliberative democracy is different from liberal democracy in that “preferences and 
interests are not brought into the conversation as in a battle –with one person or group 
wining and others losing” (Scholsberg, et. al, 2005: 216). Democratic deliberation aims 
at citizens’ education through reasoned debate; it is a “form of social learning” nurtured 
from different types of knowledge –expert, vernaculr, ocal- and diverse arguments –
moral and non-moral (Barry, 1999: 229).  
Second, deliberative democracy is likely to increase the effectiveness, 
sustainability and legitimacy of decisions. On the one hand, increased citizen 
participation usually means more democratic and authentic decisions; this would 
generate more legitimate environmental politics and policy (Scholsberg et al, 2005; 
Dryzek, 2000; Smith, 2003; Fischer, 2000). To put it with Dryzek, “the deliberative turn 
represents a renewed concern with the authenticity of democracy: the degree to which 
democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged by competent 
citizens” (2000: 1). On the other hand, the normative indeterminacy, epistemological 
uncertainty and complexity of socio-environmental issues indicate that the sustainable 
society has to be built upon a dialogue between different points of view, and this would 
be rendered possible in a deliberative setting (Barry, 1999). Deliberative democracy has 
the ability to result in a more democratic making of environmental knowledge. When 
citizens and experts engage in a conversation, scientific and expert knowledge can be 
complemented with other forms of knowledge – like those grounded on citizens’ 
practical experiences or indigenous knowledge. In this respect, Barry argues that 
“communicative rationality makes it less likely tha the collective result will be 
ecologically irrational”, since democracy conceived as communication “provides some 
evidence that individuals can deliver enhanced enviro mental public goods and avoid or 
limit environmental public bads” (Barry, 1996: 125; 1999: 230).  
And third, deliberative democracy would render possible the inclusion in 
political processes and of all traditionally excluded voices. Inclusion of difference is not 
just at the heart of democratic political organisation, but, for most greens, it is a 
precondition for achieving sustainability. The delib rative ideal is based on the principle 
of plural participation and equality among all participants. Cosequently, all individuals 
and groups should enjoy the same opportunities to intervene and be heard, and the 
different points of view emerged during the discursive process should be equally 
respected (Scholsberg, et. al. 2005). This is especially relevant in the environmental 
context, where decisions always embody a particular conception of nature and of 
humans’ place in it, which, in all probability, will clash with other positions. In this 
respect, it has been argued that there is a “value conflict …at the heart of environmental 
politics” (Smith, 2003: 1), reflected in the different groups which make up the green 
movement. Each of them – from grassroots ecologists to liberal environmentalists; from 
ecosocialists to ecological feminists- give priority to different values and goals, and 
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conceive human-nature relations in different ways. Deliberative democratic mechanisms 
would provide a common space for dialogue and cooperation. This could be a solution 
to integrate the plurality and diversity of environmental groups, and to foster debate 
about the variety of different possible forms of the sustainable society and the means to 
achieve it (Smith, 2003; Barry, 1999). In Barry’s words: “the point about deliberative 
democratic institutions is that they can bring out the intersubjective character of 
environmental values, and articulate publicly the different forms of human valuing and 
bring them to bear in social-environmental decision” (1999: 219). 
In addition, participants in discursive institutions are encouraged to place 
themselves in the position of those excluded, underrepresented or undervalued in 
political processes (Eckersley, 1998, 2000; O’Neill, 2002; Goodin, 1996; Barry, 1999). 
Green theorists have identified three different types of excluded interests -or “new 
environmental constituencies”- that should be incorporated to political deliberation: 
future generations, the affected non-national citizens and the non-human world (Barry, 
1999; Dobson, 1996b). Socio-ecological issues, their causes, and their effects, do not 
respect state boundaries, nor are they confined to present generations of human beings, 
nor even to human beings. The “principle of the affected interests” suggests that the 
views of all those having an interest in environmental decisions should be taken into 
account (Dobson, 1996b). In Barry’s view this can oly be achieved through 
deliberation about all the possible interpretations f what the interests of the excluded 
others might be (Barry, 1999).  
Advocates of deliberative democracy have critics, and environmental 
deliberative democrats are no exception. To start with, there are a number of obstacles 
to participation, rooted in power relations and inequalities, such as language, education, 
information, available time and economic resources. Moreover, deliberative politics 
have been put into question for being a rationalist, masculine and Western politics, and 
this is shown by the primacy of certain forms of argumentation and rationality criteria. 
As feminist theorists have pointed out, political claims cannot be separated from 
personal experience, cultural circumstances, class issues and the material interests of 
those making such claims (Eckersley, 2004). Genuine exchange of opinions between 
citizens and between these and experts is only possible if both citizens and experts have 
the same chance to exert some influence on the policy process, without manipulation of 
information (Barry, 1999). 
Other problems arise when the question is examined form an ecological 
perspective. Deliberation has the potential to produce the transformation of non-
ecological preferences through debate, but it cannot guarantee per se a better quality of 
social-environmental decisions. In fact, it can also ead to unsustainable and unfair 
arrangements. Therefore we should not think of it as a panacea for the solution of 
ecological problems, as green democratic theorists acknowledge (Barry, 1999; Dobson, 
1996a; Christoff, 1996; Fischer, 2000).  Nevertheless a discursive environment provides 
space for different conceptions of sustainable development to emerge and be compared 
by citizens (Smith, 2003). So even if it is difficult to see how deliberative democracy 
could deliver, on its own, environmental ends, it could be argued that the openness and 
inclusiveness of the communication process would provide a good setting for different 
values to arise and be incorporated into environmental public policy. And, although 
deliberative democracy may not necessarily improve the sustainability of outcomes, at 





2. A theory of ecological democracy 
 
Despite the uncertainties and limitations, ecological theories of democracy are 
highly influence by deliberative principles. Now I would like to examine the meaning 
and content of one of these theories of ecological democracy, as developed in her 2004 
book, The Green State. This is one of the most recent and sophisticated ccounts of a 
green model of democracy.  
Ecological democracy has, in Eckersley’s treatment, four key features: 1) it is a 
deliberative democracy; 2) with a distinctively normative and ecological content as a 
result of incorporating environmental justice within deliberative democratic theory, 
more specifically within the concept of communicative justice; 3) consequently, it has 
an expanded community of justice defined as a “community at risk”; 4) and a 
transnational dimension. It is relevant to explain briefly these four aspects.  
Eckersley conceives ecological democracy as a deliberative democracy because 
she thinks that the deliberative model offers more possibilities for achieving the goals of 
an ecological politics than liberal democracy, inline with the arguments advanced in the 
previous section. Her point of departure is the discur ive theory of law, democracy and 
the state developed by Jürgen Habermas, mainly in his work Between Facts and Norms 
(1992). Her aim is to give a normative and ecological content to Habermas’ theory, 
which, for Eckersley, is a procedural account of democracy. In Eckersley’s view, a 
theory of democracy needs to pay attention not only to processes and institutions but 
also to the values inspiring such processes and institutions. For her, the values guiding 
an ecological democracy are environmental, social and communicative justice. Her 
method of “critical political ecology” wants to “incorporate the demand for social and 
environmental justice in the broader context of the demand for communicative justice” 
(2004: 10). To such end, environmental justice is understood as “first, a fair distribution 
of the benefits and risks of social cooperation and, second, the minimization of those 
risks in relation to an expanded moral community” (2004: 10). On the other hand, 
communicative justice is defined as a “fair/free communicative context in which wealth 
and risk production and distribution decisions takes place in ways that are reflectively 
acceptable by all ‘differently situated others’ (or their representatives) who may be 
affected” (2004: 10). 
This threefold conception of justice gives a distinctly normative and ecological 
dimension to ecological democracy. As a result, the moral community or community of 
justice is expanded so as to include no-human nature, f ture generations and members 
of other states. This extension is based on the princi le that “all those potentially 
affected by a risk should have some meaningful opportunity to participate or otherwise 
be represented in the making of the policies or decisions that generate the risk” (2004: 
111). Thus the moral and political community is defin d as a “community of the 
affected” or “community at risk”, regardless of nationality, territory or species. Of 
course this does not require that all those potentially affected by a risk should reach a 
consensus as the basis for any decision to be adopted; it means that those participating 
in decision-making should consider the interests of th se absent from deliberations as if 
they were present, so that “the unfair displacement of risk” is avoided (2004: 111)3. The 
                                                
3  These ideas evoke the cosmopolitan and deliberativ  ideals of a “democracy of the affected”, especially 
the Habermasian “ideal communication community” and cosmopolitan accounts off democracy and the 
political community such as those defended, amongst others, by David Held. What is different from these 
treatments is the ecological element that expands this idea of the democracy of the affected to non-human 
species and ecological communities, so as to include the preoccupations of environmental justice 
theorists, deep ecologists and other ecocentric greens, as well as risk society advocates (2004: 111-112). 
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enlargement of the moral community is grounded on a non-anthropocentric and non-
instrumental conception of the non-human world that an icipates the possibility of 
environmental policy grounded on an ecological ethics.  
A further consequence of the risk-based conception of the political community is 
that ecological democracy becomes a transnational democracy, with institutions and 
rights of citizenship that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. At the theoretical 
level, this transnationality is justified with the Habermasian idea of “constitutional 
patriotism”, brought into ecological thought by Eckersley as “environmental 
patriotism”. Environmental patriotism can be found i  the social bond that connects 
activists in transnational social movements. It is the shared commitment to facing 
common problems using democratic means, avoiding the displacement of their 
consequences onto the environment and future generations4. After transnational 
citizenship has been justified at the level of principles, Eckersley argues that 
environmental patriotism could be then constitutionally entrenched within the state, in 
the form of “symbolic/aspirational statements of obligations to humankind and the 
global environment in state constitutions” (2004: 196). Indeed, she refers to a “green 
constitution” that would institutionalise not only environmental patriotism but also the 
values and processes defining her ecological democracy. 
How could this democratic model described by Eckersley be institutionalised? 
She suggests that we should look at innovative democratic mechanisms adopted by 
some states, since they could be indicating a move t wards the kind of processes that 
she associates with ecological democracy. Particularly, she is thinking of “community 
right-to-know legislation, community environmental monitoring and reporting, third-
party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory 
policy advisory committees, citizens’ juries, conseus conferences, and public 
environmental inquiries” (2004: 92). These institutional designs have brought about an 
increase in democratic participation in environmental decision-making, while at the 
same time allowing for a wider public control of state agencies in charge for 
environmental policy. So they are “partial antidotes o the technocratic dimensions of 
the administrative state” (2004: 92).  
The above mechanisms should be further developed to tackle what is arguably 
the biggest problem that the institutionalization of ecological democracy poses: the 
participation or representation of all those potentially affected by a risk. This requires 
transboundary deliberative mechanisms and, as we sa earlier, the inclusion of non-
human nature and future generations in democratic del beration. As an example of how 
this incorporation could be achieved, Eckersley suggests several options, namely the 
creation of forums in which elected individuals can express the concerns of citizens of 
foreign countries; the constitution of assemblies where members of environmental 
groups would be responsible for the proxy representation of non-humans and future 
generations; or even the enactment of environmental defenders offices for 
“environmental monitoring, political advocacy, and legal representation” (2004: 134). 
On the other hand, new rights and procedures that favour the disadvantaged are needed 
to ensure that decisions concerning risk production d  not represent the interest of a 
                                                                                                                                    
The extension of the moral community to include nature and future generations, who cannot participate in 
deliberations, makes ecological democracy become a “democracy for the affected” instead of a 
“democracy of the affected”, since the number of beings and groups whose interests should be taken into 
account will always exceed those actually participating (2004: 112). 
4 Environmental patriotism can be encouraged by means of deepening local knowledge, attachment to 
particular places and citizenship bonds at the local level (based on community relationships) as the basis 
for knowledge and concern for the interests of strangers, including future generations, non fellow citizens 
and other species. 
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few. To this end, the precautionary principle could be incorporated into laws and 
constitutions, and extended to include non-humans (2004: 135-136). As a complement, 
a human right to the environment could also be establi hed (2004: 136); this would 
include rights to environmental information, rights of participation, and the right to 
environmental remedies when harm is suffered (2004: 137). Finally, a green 
constitution should establish that court decisions take into account the way such 
decisions would affect members of other states, the environment and future generations. 
At the multilateral level, these initiatives should be complemented with multilateral 
cooperative agreements between states establishing both reciprocal rights and duties 
between states and transnational citizenship rights and duties (2004: 178, 196). If all 
these mechanisms were implemented, environmental justice would be, in Eckersley’s 
view, embedded within state institutions.  
It is important to note that Eckersley’s notion of ecological democracy has to be 
read in the context of her green theory of the state. Once articulated in the constitutional 
system, ecological democracy will be one of the catalys s of the green state or of the 
ecological transformation of the state. But, at thesame time, the promotion of an 
ecological democracy is one of the main functions Eckersley assigns to her green state5. 
However, although Eckersley develops her model of ec logical democracy as part of 
her theory of the state, she believes ecological democracy has to be instantiated also in 
civil society.  
 
 
3. Ecological democracy, liberal democracy and deliberative democracy 
 
Now, I would like to explore the relationship between ecological democracy and 
liberal democracy. To do so, Eckersley’s claim that ecological democracy is not liberal 
but “postliberal” will be examined. This analysis is relevant for various reasons: first, 
because it helps us examine the normative presuppositions that inform Eckersley’s 
theory; second, because it will highlight some ways in which deliberative democracy 
could be more inclusive and democratic than liberal democracy. 
So the question I want to pose now is: is ecological democracy different from 
liberal democracy or is it an ecological transformation of liberal democracy? Although 
ecological democracy emerges from existing liberal institutions and values, Eckersley 
claims that it is not a green liberal democracy6. It is not antiliberal either. Rather than 
                                                
5 There is an ambiguous relationship between ecological democracy and the green state. It is not clear 
what comes first. Sometimes it seems that once ecological democracy is instantiated within the 
constitutional and political system of a state, this sate will become a green state, so in this respect 
ecological democracy is one of the preconditions for the creation of a green state (together with a 
reflexive or strong ecological modernisation and a post-wesfalian international system of cooperative 
states). But Eckersley also argues that one of the goals of the green state (and thus we assume that the 
green state has already been created if it is adscribed a goal) is to facilitate ecological democracy, 
therefore ecological democracy will come about after th  green state. Can ecological democracy be both 
cause and result of the green sate? If this is the cas , then it becomes difficult to determine how a green 
state is going to be created, which, in turn, makes it difficult to distinguish between introducing some 
reforms along environmental lines in a liberal state that will remain liberal, and creating a green state 
which is postliberal. 
6 Eckersley also argues that her approach differs form civic republican accounts of democracy in the 
conception of the common good. Ecological democracy assumes that in contemporary highly pluralized 
and heterogeneous societies, the common good cannot emerge spontaneously, nor it can be defined out of 
a shared ethos. In this respect, Eckersley would regard her ecological democracy different from 
republicanism (2004: 145-146), or perhaps, we should better say that this would make her account 
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rejecting the main achievements of liberalism, ecological democracy draws on them7. 
This makes ecological democracy be, in Eckersley’s own understanding, a postliberal 
democracy (2004: 96)8.  
In which particular ways is ecological democracy postliberal? Eckersley never 
offers a list of principles inspiring a postliberal democracy but, throughout her critique 
of liberal democracy, she refers to some features of liberalism that prevent it from 
delivering environmental environmental justice, namely its notion of value pluralism, its 
conception of autonomy, the public-private divide, the ethical subjectivism, and the 
“liberal dogmas”. An immanent critique of these conepts and ideas is Eckersley’s point 
of departure to develop a postliberal theory. I will briefly discuss them. 
1. Liberal value pluralism, is not rejected but “radicalised” to pay attention to the 
collective structures where people’s values and preferences are formed. Liberal politics, 
at present, do not consider this social context, but just take values and preferences as 
pre-given (2004: 96-99). This radicalisation of value pluralism is related to the defence 
of a deliberative conception of democracy, as being more legitimate than aggregative 
conceptions. 
2. The “enlightment ideal of autonomy” is accepted although revised at least in 
three different ways. Firstly, in relation to the way it informs the liberal individualistic 
ontology of the self as detached from any biological and social constraints. 
Communitarians have long argued that the liberal notio  of the self leads to an 
instrumental conception of the others. Ecological though can expand this critique 
showing that the liberal ontology of the self does not acknowledge individuals’ 
dependence on nature (2004: 104-105). Another way in wh ch the concept of autonomy 
is revised is implicit in that those responsible for risk-generating activities have to give 
reasons in an open and free communicative context to jus ify their views that might lead 
to norms or policies that create unjust risks (2004: 114). The burden of the proof for 
suffering the consequences of a risk is, thus, revers d. In this way decisions based on a 
concept of autonomy “that cannot be generalized” are sought to be prevented (2004: 
107). The inclusion of traditionally excluded groups exemplifies the third way in which 
the liberal concept of autonomy is extended. In liberal democracies, issues related to the 
non-human world and future generations belong to the realm of the ethical, to the 
particular conception of the good that one has; they ar  not moral issues, in the sense 
that they are not issues of justice. And, since they ar  not a matter of justice, they do not 
define the procedural rules, but they relate to outc mes. In an ecological democracy non 
humans and future generations are represented regardl ss of the particular conceptions 
of the good that participants in debate have.  
3. In an ecological democracy the distinction betwen the private and public is 
put into question. Activities like investment, production and consumption are 
considered risk generating activities that should be discussed in democratic debate 
(2004: 96-98, 242).  
4. The “ethical subjectivism” of liberalism is replaced by the “intersubjective 
assessment of agents’ preferences” (2004: 140). This requires that participants in 
                                                                                                                                    
different from classical republicanism, since contemporary republicanism is more sensitive to issues of 
diversity and disagreement.  
7 Especially representative democracy, constitutional sm, the rule of law and the protection of civil and 
political citizenship rights, and seeks to address their limitations. 
8Other green political theorists besides Eckersley have characterised environmental political thought as 
postliberal, in so far as it would emerge from an ontological critique of liberalism (Eckersley 1992; 
Doherty 1996; Barry 1999) 
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democratic debate engage in a critical discussion of all possible perspectives and points 
of view of the differently situated others until some form of consensus emerges. 
5. “Liberal dogmas”, like anthropocentrism, instrumentalism, individualism, the 
idea of “rational, autonomous, and freely choosing individuals”, “the sanctity of private 
property rights”, freedom as “material plenitude” and “overconfidence in the rational 
mastery of nature through further scientific and technologic process”, would be 
questioned in a “genuinely free communication-community” (2004: 108). But in 
Eckersley’s view such community does not exist at present, since liberal democratic 
procedures exclude from citizens’ analysis, the politica  and economic interests that 
continue to benefit over and over from the preservation of such dogmas (2004: 109). An 
ecological democracy provides the free and unsconstrai ed communicative context 
where liberal creeds can be contested. 
 6. Lastly, the transnational dimension of ecological democracy should be 
considered as one of the elements that make the green state be a postliberal state9.  
This brief analysis of postliberalism shows that ecological democracy poses 
moral, epistemological, political and institutional challenges to liberal democracy. It 
also seems to indicate that ecological democracy is more legitimate than its liberal 
counterpart, basically for two reasons: 1) because of the stress on deliberation, instead 
of assuming citizens preferences as pre-given, non-negotiable and independent from 
social and biological constraints, and 2) because ecological democracy is grounded on 
more inclusive institutions, opened to those systema ically excluded in liberal 
democracies. In other words, Eckersley argues that ecological democracy is more 
legitimate than liberal democracy because it institutionalises the principle of the 
affected, and because it is more accountable towards its own citizens, other 
communities and states.  
But the fact that ecological democracy is arguably more democratic, legitimate 
and authentic than liberal democracy, is not enough to make ecological democracy 
transcend the philosophical framework of liberalism. The truth is that the main 
difference between a liberal democracy and a postliberal one is not procedural, but 
normative. This is not to say that an ecological democracy embodies certain values 
while liberal democracy is value free10. It is the difference between the respective set of 
values upheld what constitutes the main difference between both. It could be argued that 
there is a difference in relation to the kind of procedures implemented by each model of 
democracy, since, as we have seen, ecological democracy introduces deliberative 
mechanisms that would complement representative institutions. But this deliberative 
nature is not what makes ecological democracy substantially different from liberal 
democracy. Part of the deliberative mechanisms Eckersley refers to have already been 
implemented by some states and they do not have produced as a result a different type 
of democracy but a more participatory liberal democracy.  
Eckersley is aware of this limitation of her work. She concedes that the 
“institutional innovations” that she offers do not represent “a radical departure from 
liberal democracy, merely a radical extension of it” (2004: 137). In fact, as we shall see, 
some theorists of liberalism argue that, in some contexts, citizens’ preferences should be 
subject to transformation through debate in the pubic sphere, so democracy for them 
would have a liberal as well as a deliberative elemnt. In short, in Eckesrely’s account 
ecological democracy has two dimensions, normative and procedural. Only the 
                                                
9 Note that in Eckersley’s account transnational ecological democracy is different from liberal 
cosmopolitan democracy 
10 See Dobson (2003), Doherty and de Geus (1996b) and Bell (2001) about the non-neutrality of 
liberalism. 
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normative dimension should be regarded as postliberal and therefore different from the 
liberal model, while the procedural dimension improves but does not alter the main 
elements of the liberal democratic model.  
However, one could argue that Eckersley’s approach resonates with those 
arguments that defend a more social, egalitarian and less atomist conception of 
liberalism. Some of the reforms suggested by Eckerskey, like the reformulation of the 
concepts of autonomy and pluralism, a politics and ethics that go beyond 
instrumentalism and anthropocentrism, and a rejection of the unconditional defence of 
property rights and free-market values, are also part of those proposals that want to 
create a more ecological account of liberalism (Stephens, 2001; Hailwood, 2004 and 
2005; Bell, 2005). It is not the aim of this paper to argue that Eckerley’s approach is too 
moderate and conformist but to suggest that, first, she might be using a narrow 
description of liberalism, and second, that perhaps what she wants to present as a 
democratic model different from liberalism could be st understood as an ecological 
reform of liberal democracy, or at least that her work resonates with some types of 
green liberalism. 
After having confronted Eckersley’s model with itself, with its own assumptions 
about postliberalism and the connections that, in my view, her work has with ecological 
liberalism, we will now go a bit deeper in the analysis, trying to bring the discussion to 
a different level. In order to do so, I will introduce John Dryzek’s11 discursive theory of 
democracy, and then we will move into a dialogue betwe n Eckersley’s ecological 
democracy and Dryzek’s discursive democracy. The purpose of this dialogue between 
the two theorists is to get a broader view of the nexus between deliberation and green 
politics, and to embed Eckersley’s theory of ecological democracy within theories of 
deliberative democracy.  
    Like Eckersley, Dryzek also distinguishes his account of democracy from 
liberalism. The quest for more legitimate democrati processes led liberal theorists to 
inquiry about deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 1994: 190). This inquiry has resulted in 
a deliberative democratic trend that is at the same ti  liberal and constitutionalist, and 
seeks to instantiate deliberative processes within liberal democratic institutions. 
According to Dryzek, there are at least three ways, compatible and mutually reinforcing, 
to link liberal philosophy with democratic theory through deliberation. The first one 
consists in using deliberative democracy’s guiding principles to justify the existence of 
individual rights, particularly those rights needed for the exercise of democratic 
citizenship, and thus needed to sustain deliberative democracy itself. This would include 
rights to political equality, to free expression and association, to a basic education and 
to a minimum level of material well-being. A second way for the connection between 
deliberative and liberal democracy would be to use lib ral constitutions to create a 
public space for deliberation. In this view, constitutions should establish that one of the 
new functions or goals for the state is to promote deliberative democracy, and thus 
establish new rules and mechanisms that consolidate eliberation. Finally, the 
constitution itself can be made through a deliberative process (Dryzek, 2000: 10-17). 
Together with these three approaches mentioned by Dryzek, we could indicate a fourth 
nexus between deliberative democracy and liberalism: this is ecologism. Deliberative 
democracy is described by some green political thinkers (like John Barry, for instance) 
as a way to reconcile environmental goals with liberal values such as individual 
freedom and autonomy. 
                                                
11 Dryzek’s theory is a lot richer and deals with more issues than those being discussed in this paper, such 
as transnational democracy and ecological rationality that allows for the integration of the non-human 
world into deliberative democratic processes. 
 11 
In Dryzek’s view, the three ways he mentions in which deliberative democracy 
can become a nexus between liberalism and democratic theory result in the assimilation 
of deliberative democracy by liberalism. He argues that the rapprochement between 
liberal and democratic principles through deliberation ignores that the institutions of 
liberal democracy are part of the state, and that te state is constrained by a series of 
factors, mainly economic, that affect its functions. In a capitalist economy, the health of 
liberal democracy relies on economic growth so thatsocial and political inequalities 
remain hidden. If inequalities become more visible, social instability arises and 
threatens the very existence of liberal democracy. Dr zek argues that the fear of this 
unfavourable economic scenario renders liberal democracies “imprisoned by the 
market’s growth imperative” (1994: 180). The accumulation imperative restricts public 
policy and becomes an obstacle for the democratisation of the state, and for effective 
deliberation. Dryzek believes that the space were deliberative and liberal democracy 
interact is ambiguous and, as a result, deliberative democracy is undermined by the 
liberal capitalist state (1994: 190 and 2000: 29).  
 
 
4. Beyond liberalism and the state: deliberative democracy and the public sphere    
 
In order to keep distance from the three liberal approaches to deliberative 
democracy described, Dryzek places the space for political deliberation in civil society 
and the “oppositional public spheres”. He introduces a distinction between discursive 
democracy and deliberative democracy, where deliberativ  democracy is understood as 
liberal constitutionalist deliberative democracy, while discursive democracy is inspired 
in critical theory that questions both liberal democracy and the political economy of 
liberalism, as developed by Habermas (2000). However, Dryzek argues that this second 
source of inspiration of deliberative democracy, critical theory, has lost its capacity to 
question the status quo. Both Dryzek and Eckersley (2004: 144) agree that there is a 
“constitutional turn” in the work of Habermas. After his theory of communicative 
action, he moved his analysis from the public sphere towards the formal processes of 
rule-making. Thus Habermas is accused of accepting co stitutionalism, representative 
democracy, and the delegation of powers that characterise liberalism. He is said to have 
abandoned the emancipatory promise of critical theory and to ignore those structures 
outside the constitutional system that demand further democratisation, such as the 
Administrative state and the economy. Some commentators believe that such an 
involution in Habermas’ thought suggests that, despit  its origins outside liberalism, 
critical theory has been assimilated by liberalism (Eckersley, 2004: 141-150; Dryzek, 
2000: 22-27). As Dryzek puts it: “liberalism is the most effective vacuum cleaner in the 
history of political thought, capable of sucking upall the doctrines that appear to 
challenge it, be they critical theory, environmentalism, feminism, or socialism” (2000: 
27).  
 Despite this assimilation of critical-theory-inspired deliberative democracy by 
liberalism, some authors writing within the critical tradition have sought to rethink the 
institutions of liberal democracy, including its political economy, as well as the liberal 
capitalist state from a position that challenges them, opposing the accommodation 
between the two. This more oppositional trend seeks the radical reform of the liberal 
democratic state or the search for spaces alternative to state institutions where 
deliberative democracy can be articulated, such as civil society, the public sphere and 
workplace democracy (Dryzek, 2000: 27). This view is defended amongst other 
scholars by Dryzek himself. I would argue that also Eckersley’s ecological democracy 
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should be placed within these critical deliberative th ories which focus both on the 
reform of the liberal state as well as on civil society and the public sphere.  
 Using the method of the immanent critique of social and political reality in order 
to identify the emancipatory potential in existing structures, Eckersley’s strategy is to 
tackle the obstacles that prevent states from acting in more ecological ways. In her view, 
these are: the international anarchic state system, neoliberal dogmas and global 
capitalism. Eckersley develops her theory of ecological democracy as part of her theory 
of the state. She believes that ecological democracy is the most essential transformation 
states need to undertake in order to become green states. So the green state will emerge 
out of the liberal state, as a result of introducing and securing ecological democracy in 
the constitution of the liberal state, as I explained earlier. In so far as ecological 
democracy is placed within a theory of the state and institutionalised by constitutional 
means, my point is that it runs the risk of being assimilated and neutralised, or to use 
Dryzek’s terms of being sucked up, by the liberal st te, and thus not lead to the kinds of 
transformations needed to originate a green state.  
If we take Drzek’s approach, especially his distinction between liberal 
constitutionalist deliberative democracy and critical discursive democracy, it is not 
difficult to conclude that the model described by Dryzek as liberal constitutionalist 
deliberative democracy resonates with Eckersley’s democratic project. To start with, 
just as liberal constitutionalist theorists, Eckersl y stresses the importance of 
constitution making. For her, the constitution establishes the state’s responsibilities, 
functions and objectives. And one of these objectivs is precisely to facilitate ecological 
democracy. On the other hand, Eckersley uses deliberat v  democracy to justify rights 
of participation and political equality, that is, of those rights needed as a precondition to 
maintain deliberative democracy itself. So, like liberal constitutional democrats, 
Eckersley uses the constitution (also made through a deliberative process) in order to 
implement deliberative mechanisms and substantive rights, such as the right to a healthy 
environment, that make an ecological and deliberative democracy possible. In short, it 
could be argued that Eckersley’s theory of the state makes a connection between liberal 
and deliberative principles.  
We must admit, though, that despite her emphasis on the state and its formal 
institutions, Eckersley believes that deliberative settings are to be encouraged also in the 
public sphere. Indeed, she thinks that without a vibrant public sphere ecological 
democracy is not likely to survive, since one of the preconditions of ecological 
democracy is, in her view, a “new ecological sensibility” produced as a result of a 
cultural shift. And this cultural shift can only take place in the public sphere (2004: 
245). That is why in Eckersley’s theory, the constitution, although necessary, is not 
enough. In fact, there is in her theory a “virtuous circle of change” that would include a 
green constitution, a sustainable economy (achieved in her view through reflexive 
ecological modernisation), civil society and a green public sphere (where an ongoing 
debate about the conditions for ecological sustainability would take place). The green 
state will arise after the conditions of this virtuous circle of change are put in place. 
However, it is the state and the constitution that are entrusted with the promotion of 
ecological democracy and, furthermore, with the promotion of the public sphere through 
mechanisms that seek to secure the availability of inf rmation about risk-generating 
activities, citizens’ participation in deliberations and access to environmental justice. In 
other words, the state and its constitution have to facilitate ecological democracy and 
create the conditions for the emergence of a green public sphere. So, unlike Dryzek, 
Eckersley’s public sphere where deliberative democracy takes place not only is not 
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opposing the state but it is part of the state, and it is encouraged by the state itself, 
lacking any autonomy. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the stres  Eckersley places on civil 
society and the public sphere, as complementing and being equally important as state 
institutions, does not mean per se that her democratic theory seeks to confront 
liberalism. The celebration of civil society and the public sphere is common amongst 
liberal scholars of deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2000: 55). In fact, both civil society 
and the public sphere have a liberal reading in the history of political thought. 
Moreover, scholars of deliberative constitutionalism believe that one of the main 
purposes of the constitution is to establish the necessary means for a public sphere for 
debate to be maintained. My claim is that despite her explicit postliberalism, 
Eckersley’s constitutionalism and state-centred democracy brings her back to liberalism.    
If the presence and inclusion of civil society and the public sphere are not 
enough for deliberative democracy to be critical, and to address the shortcomings of 
liberal democracy, what else is needed? According to Dryzek, the public sphere has to 
be autonomous, so that there is a sharp distinction between the public sphere and the 
state, to the extent that they may even be in opposition. Other than an oppositional 
public sphere, a set of “contested discourses” is also needed. Finally, opinion should 
move from the public sphere toward the state (but not the other way round) (2000: 55-
56). For Dryzek, discourses can and should affect public policy (2000: 79). The only 
condition is that the public sphere where such discourses are generated remains 
autonomous and completely separated form the state, o avoid discourses being 
assimilated and co-opted by the state (which is different from discourses having an 
impact on state policy). As a result, political activity in civil society must seek the 
“democratic exercise of power over the state”, while being vigilant to avoid “the 
inclusion of civil society within the state”. In fact, Dryzek believes that civil society can 
be the locus for enforceable and binding decisions t  be adopted, even if they don’t 
emanate from state institutions12. When human beings decide to live a public life in civil 
society and solve our collective problems in a space outside the state, civil society 
becomes a site for “para-governmental activity” (2000: 102-103).  
The above theory shows a complex and uncertain relationship between the state 
and civil society. In Drzek’s account, such a relationship cannot be explained in 
universal terms, since it depends on particular featur s of states and civil societies, on 
particular times and places. Therefore it should be studied from a historical and 
comparative approach. Dryzek develops a typology of states based on different state-
civil society relations (Dryzek, 2000; Dryzek et al 2003). A civil society with a myriad 
of contested discourses will be more likely to be maintained when interacting with an 
“exclusive” state, since an “inclusive” state can absorb and erode diversity (2000: 113-
14). Using Dryzek’s typology, I would argue that Eckersley’s green state is inclusive, 
open and receptive to civil society deliberations, to the extent that the state acts as a 
facilitator of such deliberations, providing the available information for debate to take 
place and facilitating the mechanisms for participation. A state that incorporates civil 
society into its own political and constitutional structures would absorb and neutralise 
civil society.    
Dryzek contends that the “promise of democratic authenticity represented by the 
deliberative turn” in democratic theory will only be accomplished if deliberation targets 
power structures. Authenticity means for Dryzek thecontestation of discourses that 
takes place in the public sphere (2000:162). Despit her statism, Eckersley also 
                                                
12 Dryzek believes that situations like this have taken place in the past whenever changes in power 
relations in society occurred, like those originated within the family as a result of the feminist struggle. 
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acknowledges deliberation in civil society. However, while for Eckersley the state is 
entrusted with the coordination of deliberation that takes place in both spaces, state and 
civil society, for Dryzek coordination is entrusted to spontaneous networks in civil 
society. This spontaneous system is similar to the way international organisations and 
movements are organised. It is related to transnatio l discourses in the public sphere, 
placed outside spatial and temporal boundaries (2000: 159-160). 
In order to conclude, it could be argued that Eckersley’s model of ecological 
democracy has many virtues: to name but a few, the integration of excluded groups, 
respect for diversity, the centrality of environmental justice and the possibilities for non-
human-centred ethics and politics. It can help overcome some of the problems of liberal 
democracy’s lack of legitimacy and some of the criticisms often directed at deliberative 
democracy, such as the denial of power relations invalidating the ideal speech situation. 
However, some of the problems persist. For instance, th  uncertainty of ecological 
outcomes of deliberations. The discussion of Dryzek’s work has been used to show how 
Eckersley’s ecological democracy can be assimilated by the liberal state and thus not 
going in the direction Eckersley wants to place it, towards the green state. So perhaps 
we could use Dryzek’s ideas to think about ways to locate ecological democracy in civil 
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